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PAGE 01 STATE 301474
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

66011

DRAFTED BY: S/S:TMARTIN

APPROVED BY: S/S:TMARTIN

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S E C R E T STATE 301474

NODIS

FOR Z. BRZEZINSKI

FOLLOWING REPEAT USUN 5720 SENT ACTION SECSTATE 17 DEC 77

QUOTE S E C R E T USUN 5720

NODIS

FROM AMBASSADOR YOUNG TO SECRETARY AND BRZEZINSKI

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PORG, ENRG, RH

SUBJ: RHODESIA-SPECIFIC OIL SANCTIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA

REF: (A) USUN 5661; (B) USUN 5716

1. THE FOURTH COMMITTEE'S CALL, ENDORSED BY THE UNGA DECEMBER 17, FOR SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ON TIGHTENED OIL SANCTIONS ON RHODESIA MAKES IT ALMOST CERTAIN THAT THIS ISSUE WILL COME BEFORE THE COUNCIL IN THE NEAR FUTURE -- PROBABLY IN JANUARY.

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2. WE ARE NOW IN THE PROCESS OF CCORDINATING STRATEGY WITH THE BRITISH FOR THE EXPECTED SC SESSIONS ON RHODESIA, WHENEVER THEY MAY COME. WE ARE AGREED WITH THE BRITISH THAT ANY ACTION WE MIGHT SUPPORT ON TIGHTENING OIL SANCTIONS MUST BE VIEWED IN THE OVERALL FRAMEWORK OF OUR JOINT SETTLEMENT INITIATIVE -- AND NOT JUST AS A RESPONSE TO A CRISIS IN NEW YORK. I AM CONCERNED, HOWEVER, THAT THE TENOR OF OUR TALKS WITH THE BRITISH -- AND INDEED THE TENOR OF OUR OWN INTERNAL DEBATE -- IS ESSENTIALLY STILL A REACTIVE, DAMAGE-LIMITING ONE. BECAUSE WE TREATED SC ACTION ON

RHODESIA (AND HENCE EXPANDED SANCTIONS) AS SOMETHING TO BE AVOIDED THIS FALL, WE APPEAR NOW TO BE LETTING THE MOMENTUM OF THAT DELAYING STRATEGY WASH OVER INTO A PERIOD WHEN AVOIDANCE OF UN ACTION ON TIGHTENING OR EXPANDING RHODESIA SANCTIONS MIGHT NOT RPT NOT BE OUR WISEST COURSE.

3. WE HAVE REACHED A POINT IN THE OVERALL NEGOTIATIONS IN RHODESIA WHERE THE ABSENCE OF EFFECTIVE ACTION TO BACK UP OUR PROMISE NOT TO LET SMITH IMPEDE AN EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT IS BECOMING A KEY OBSTACLE TO THE SUCCESS OF THOSE NEGOTIATIONS. NKOMO SIMPLY DOES NOT BELIEVE WE WILL ACT, AND APPEARS TO BE PLANNING HIS OWN STRATEGIES ACCORDINGLY. A SIMILAR SKEPTICISM ADDS TO THE INCENTIVES OF MUZOREWA AND SITHOLE TO OBTAIN THROUGH AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OF WHAT THEY DOUBT WILL EVER BE DELIVERED TO THEM BY UK/US PRESSURES ON SMITH. CENTRIFUGAL TENDENCIES AMONG THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS FEED ON THE SAME DOUBT. NIGERIA IS NOW SMARTING FROM AFRICAN CRITICISM THAT SHE MAY HAVE SWALLOWED UK/US PROMISES TOO READILY. AND, OF COURSE, THE INTRANSIGENCE OF SMITH AND VORSTER IS AFFECTED BY THE DEGREE TO WHICH THEY BELIEVE WE ARE BLUFFING.

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4. I DO NOT, OF COURSE, BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD ACT TO BRING DOWN SMITH ONLY TO DELIVER RHODESIA TO CIVIL WAR AND CHAOS. THE LIBERATION LEADERS AND THE FRONT LINE MUST CARRY OUT THEIR PART OF THE BARGAIN TOO. BUT I DO BELIEVE THAT WE ARE FAST SLIDING INTO A CLASSIC CHICKEN AND EGG SITUATION. CONTRARY TO DAVID OWEN, I BELIEVE THAT THE FIRST SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT OUT OF THE CURRENT IMPASSE PROBABLY WILL HAVE TO COME FROM THE UK/US, IF ONLY BECAUSE THE DOUBT THAT WE WOULD EVER TAKE DECISIVE STEPS TO REMOVE SMITH CONTRIBUTES TO THE INTRANSIGENCE OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND TO THE HESITANCY OF THE FRONT LINE STATES AND NIGERIA TO STAY OUT ON A LIMB FOR US. WHILE SMITH'S INTERNAL SETTLEMENT MAY WELL FOUNDER ON ITS OWN INADEQUACIES, THE CURRENT LACK OF MOMENTUM IN OUR EFFORTS BOOSTS THE CHANCES OF A DEAL UNACCEPTABLE TO US BEING STRUCK IN SALISBURY.

5. THEREFORE, UNLESS THE PROSPECTS FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE UK/US PLAN UNEXPECTEDLY AND MARKEDLY IMPROVE, I SUGGEST THAT WE SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY OF THE UPCOMING SC DEBATE ON RHODESIA TO MANIFEST, FOR THE FIRST TIME, A CONCRETE WILLINGNESS TO REMOVE SMITH. WHILE THE BRITISH APPEAR TO BE SCRATCHING FOR OTHER OPTIONS, I BELIEVE THAT THE ONLY ONE THAT COULD BE EFFECTIVE IN BOTH NEW YORK AND IN AFRICA IS UK/US SUPPORT FOR COUNCIL ACTION TIGHTENING OIL SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA. EVERY SIGN SO FAR IN NEW YORK SUGGESTS THAT OIL SANCTIONS WILL BE THE

HEART OF AFRICAN DEMANDS DURING A SC RHODESIA DEBATE.

6. I SUGGEST THAT OUR CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR THAT DEBATE MOVE AWAY FROM TREATING AS OUR BOTTOM LINE THE SO-CALLED INDIAN RESOLUTION (CALLING ON MEMBER STATES TO "RE-EXAMINE" THEIR SANCTIONS LEGISLATION WITH A VIEW TO EXTENDING IT TO SUBSIDIARIES OF PARENT COMPANIES AND TO PRESCRIBING "DETERRENT PENALTIES" ON THE PARENTS IF THEIR SUBSIDIARIES CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE IN SECRET

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THE SHIPMENT OF OIL PRODUCTS TO RHODESIA). MY REASONING IS THAT:

(A) MORE EDUCATED NOW THAN IN OCTOBER TO THE REAL-WORLD COMPLEXITIES OF OIL EMBARGOES, AFRICAN DELEGATIONS HERE INCREASINGLY REGARD THE INDIAN RESOLUTION AS INEFFECTIVE. AT A MINIMUM, THEY WILL MOVE TO STRIKE THE "RE-EXAMINE" CLAUSE AND CALL FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION. THEY ALSO BELIEVE THAT, EVEN IF PASSED, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIAN RESOLUTION COULD BE DELAYED FOR YEARS BY PROTRACTED LEGAL BATTLES. THEY ALSO KNOW THAT THE INDIAN RESOLUTION WOULD NOT APPLY TO SOUTH AFRICAN CONTROLLED COMPANIES LIKE SASOL AND NATREF;

(B) FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, AND BECAUSE OF THEIR CONCERN THAT THE ANGLO-AMERICAN INITIATIVE IS IN TROUBLE, KEY AFRICAN STATES ARE MUCH LESS LIKELY NOW THAN IN OCTOBER TO VIEW OUR SUPPORT FOR THE INDIAN RESOLUTIONS AS AN EFFECTIVE STEP TOWARD REMOVING SMITH. ON THE CONTRARY, SOME ARE, AT THIS POINT, CERTAIN TO VIEW IT AS AN UNWARRANTED STALL WHOSE EFFECT WOULD BE TO BUY MORE TIME FOR SMITH.

(C) THE BRITISH STILL FLATLY REFUSE TO AGREE TO THE INDIAN RESOLUTION ON THE (PRINCIPALLY LEGAL) GROUNDS NOTED REF A.

7. AS AN ALTERNATIVE, I SUGGEST THAT WE MOVE TOWARD CONSIDERATION WITH THE BRITISH, AS OUR JOINT BOTTOM LINE, OF A SLIGHTLY AMENDED VERSION OF THE BENIN RESOLUTION (THE SO-CALLED "FIFOOT DRAFT") WHICH WOULD CALL FOR OIL SANCTIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF UNLESS THE SAG GIVES FIRM WRITTEN GUARANTEES THAT IMPORTED OIL AND PRODUCTS MADE THEREFROM WILL NOT BE TRANSSHIPPED TO RHODESIA. THIS APPROACH IS THE ONE ALREADY TAKEN BY THE COMMON-SECRET

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WEALTH COMMITTEE ON SOUTHERN AFRICA (ON WHICH THE UK SITS) AND IS A MINOR VARIATION OF THE CARROT-AND-STICK OPTION PRESENTED TO US IN WASHINGTON BY THE BRITISH IN OCTOBER. DURING OUR LAST TALKS WITH THE BRITISH ON

THIS SUBJECT (REF A) THE UK REPRESENTATIVE SAID THAT IT WAS HIS VIEW THAT, IF FACED WITH A CHOICE, HMG WOULD PREFER THE FIFOOT DRAFT TO THE INDIAN RESOLUTION. CERTAINLY THE AFRICANS (AND SMITH AND VORSTER) WOULD VIEW IT AS A MUCH MORE CONCRETE EXPRESSION OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO REMOVE SMITH.

8. BECAUSE CURRENT SOUTH AFRICAN STOCKS ARE SO LARGE, NO RHODESIA-SPECIFIC OIL EMBARGO ON SOUTH AFRICA WILL HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON STOCKS OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN RHODESIA UNLESS IT IS ABLE TO LEVER THE SAG TO MAKE THE POLITICAL DECISION TO TURN OFF, OR SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE, THE OIL FLOW NORTH. THE THREAT OF TOUGH RETALIATORY MEASURES FOR SAG NON-COOPERATION(AS IN THE FIFOOT DRAFT) WILL PROVIDE NOT ONLY A CLEAR INDICATION OF OUR DETERMINATION TO THE SAG, IT ALSO COULD OFFER THEM THE DOMESTIC JUSTIFICATION THEY WILL NEED TO CAST LOOSE FROM SMITH. PRAGMATIC BEHIND THEIR BOMBAST, I BELIEVE THAT, IF GIVEN ASSURANCES OF UK/US COMMITMENT TO A RHODESIA SETTLEMENT PLAN FAIR TO WHITES AS WELL AS BLACKS, THE SAG WILL NOT BE PREPARED TO LEAD ITS PEOPLE INTO THE LONG-TERM PRIVATIONS OF OIL RATIONING AND HIGHER PRICES IN ORDER TO BACK CONTINUED INTRANSIGENCE BY SMITH. AND EVEN IF WHITE SOUTH AFRICANS INITIALLY SHOULD ACCEPT THE BITTER COURSE, THEY WILL BE FORCED TO REEVALUTATE THEIR SUPPORT FOR SMITH WITH EACH BOOST IN GASOLINE PRICES AND EACH LENGTHENING OF LINES AT SERVICE STATIONS.

9. WHILE THE LINK CAN BE OVERSIMPLIFIED, THE CUTOFF OR SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF THE FLOW OF OIL PRODUCTS TO RHODESIA, OR EVEN THE IMPOSITION OF A RHODESIA-SPECIFIC OIL EMBARGO ON SOUTH AFRICA FOR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH OIL SECRET

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SANCTIONS ON RHODESIA, WILL INSCRIBE THE HANDWRITING ON THE WALL TO RHODESIANS, AND IT WILL INDUCE DOUBTS IN REASONABLE MEN AROUND SMITH (INCLUDING RDF COMMANDERS) OF THE WISDOM OF CONTINUED INTRANSIGENCE IN THE FACE OF THE GUARANTEES OFFERED BY THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN. AND, WHILE ENERGY SUBSTITUTIONS CAN BE MADE IN THE RHODESIAN CIVILIAN ECONOMY, AT CONSIDERABLE COST, ANY SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION OF OIL PRODUCTS MOVING NORTH WILL BE FELT RELATIVELY PROMPTLY BY SMITH'S MILITARY FORCES PROSECUTING THE GUERILLA WAR.

10. UK/US AGREEMENT TO THE FIFOOT DRAFT WOULD ALSO ALLOW US TO CREDIBLY INSIST TO THE FLS THAT THE BALL IS IN THEIR COURT. WE WOULD BE SEEN AS KEEPING OUR PART OF THE BARGAIN, AND IT WOULD BE UP TO THEM TO HAMMER THE NECESSARY UNITY AND WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE INTO THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT.

11. AS PART OF THE OVERALL APPROACH I HAVE OUTLINED, I HAVE ALREADY SUGGESTED PROMPT HIGH-LEVEL TALKS WITH THE US OIL COMPANIES WHOSE SUBSIDIARIES SUPPLY RHODESIA (REF B). IN THE EVENT AGREEMENT IS REACHED WITH THE BRITISH ON SUPPORT FOR A RHODESIA-SPECIFIC OIL EMBARGO ON SOUTH AFRICA, I FURTHER SUGGEST IMMEDIATE DISCUSSIONS WITH RELEVANT OPEC COUNTRIES TO TELL THEM OF OUR INTENTIONS AND TO ENLIST THEIR SUPPORT.

12. REGARDING OUR OWN DOMESTIC POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT, I BELIEVE THAT THE LATEST HARRIS POLL ON AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD SANCTIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA INDICATES THAT USG AGREEMENT TO RHODESIA-SPECIFIC OIL SANCTIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA WOULD BE WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF MEASURES THE AMERICAN PEOPLE COULD BE LED TO ACCEPT. TO FURTHER
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THE CASE HERE AT HOME, I BELIEVE THAT WE COULD CONVINCINGLY PRESENT THE ARGUMENT THAT SUCH SANCTIONS WOULD BE AN EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO A SCENARIO OF STEDILY INCREASING VIOLENCE IN RHODESIA WHICH WOULD PROFIT NO ONE SAVE THOSE WHO SEE ADVANTAGE FROM CHAOS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

13. ALL OF THE ABOVE, AND IN FACT OUR CURRENT LOW-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE BRITISH, TOO, ARE IN THE MODE OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING ONLY. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE PRESS FORWARD WITH THESE DISCUSSIONS IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A THOROUGH UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE US AND UK AT THIS LEVEL OF WHAT MEASURE APPEARS LIKELY TO BE BOTH EFFECTIVE IN THE PURSUIT OF OUR COMMON NEGOTIATING GOALS IN RHODESIA AND FEASIBLE TECHNICALLY AND POLITICALLY FOR BOTH GOVERNMENTS. WHEN WE HAVE CARRIED OUR TALKS TO A POINT OF PRELIMINARY UNDERSTANDING ON THIS NEXT STEP, BOTH SIDES WOULD, OF COURSE, THEN BE REQUIRED TO SUBMIT THE PROPOSITION FOR CABINET-LEVEL POLICY DECISIONS. WITHOUT THESE PREPARATORY DISCUSSIONS, NEITHER GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE BEFORE IT A THOROUGH EXAMINATION OF THE PROBLEM AND ACTION OPTIONS.
YOUNG

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 22-Sep-1999 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: OILS, CAT-B, TRADE CONTROLS, BOYCOTTS, EMBARGOES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 18-Dec-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE301474
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: S/S:TMARTIN
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: N770009-0294
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t197712111/baaaaeusg.tel
Line Count: 264
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Message ID: cef55dfc-c188-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 29-Mar-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 119649
Secure: LOCK1
Status: NATIVE
Subject: RHODESIA-SPECIFIC OIL SANCTIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA
TAGS: PORG, ENRG, ETRD, RH, SF, UNGA
To: WHITE HOUSE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/cef55dfc-c188-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009